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Abstract 
In the last 30 years, a clear trend has come to define modern immigration law and policy. A set of 
seemingly disparate developments concerning the constant reinforcement of border controls, 
tightening of conditions of entry, expanding capacities for detention and deportation and the 
proliferation of criminal sanctions for migration offences, accompanied by an anxiety on the part of 
the press, public and political establishment regarding migrant criminality can now be seen to form a 
definitive shift in the European Union towards the so-called ‘criminalisation of migration’. 
This paper aims to provide an overview of the ‘state-of-the-art’ in the academic literature and EU 
research on criminalisation of migration in Europe. It analyses three key manifestations of the so-
called ‘crimmigration’ trend: discursive criminalisation; the use of criminal law for migration 
management; and immigrant detention, focusing both on developments in domestic legislation of EU 
member states but also the increasing conflation of mobility, crime and security which has 
accompanied EU integration. By identifying the trends, synergies and gaps in the scholarly 
approaches dealing with the criminalisation of migration, the paper seeks to provide a framework for 
on-going research under Work Package 8 of the FIDUCIA project. 
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The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe 
A State-of-the-Art of the Academic Literature and Research 
Joanna Parkin
* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61 / October 2013 
Introduction 
In the last 30 years, a clear trend has come to define modern immigration law and policy. A set of seemingly 
disparate developments concerning the constant reinforcement of border controls, tightening of conditions of 
entry, expanding capacities for detention and deportation, and the proliferation of criminal sanctions for 
migration offences, accompanied by an anxiety on the part of the press, public and political establishment 
regarding migrant criminality can now be seen to form a definitive shift in the European Union towards the 
so-called ‘criminalisation of migration.’ 
This trend has begun to attract the attention of scholars from diverse disciplines, including migration studies, 
security studies, criminology, policing and law. A long tradition in US scholarship examining the issue of 
migrant criminality
1 has been followed by a younger but expanding academic literature that has begun to 
chronicle this process in the European context. The literature focuses both on developments in domestic 
legislation of EU member states and on the increasing conflation of mobility, crime and security that has 
accompanied EU integration. Furthermore, a number of EU-funded research projects have addressed diverse 
aspects of these phenomena, from the perspective of social exclusion, fundamental rights, sociology of crime 
and security and migration studies (see Annexes 1 & 2).  
This paper aims to provide an overview of the ‘state-of-the-art’ in the academic literature and EU research on 
criminalisation of migration in Europe.
2   By identifying trends, synergies and gaps in the scholarly 
approaches dealing with this topic, it seeks to provide a framework and steer the research agenda of work 
package 8 of the FIDUCIA project. 
In setting the terms of this state-of-the-art, a few methodological notes should be made. First, the term 
‘criminalisation of migration’ refers to a set of very broad and cross-cutting phenomena. Palidda (2011) 
defines the criminalisation of migrants as “all the discourses, facts and practices made by the police, judicial 
authorities, but also local governments, media, and a part of the population that hold immigrants/aliens 
responsible for a large share of criminal offences.” In view of the expansive nature of this term, this paper 
does not try to provide a comprehensive or systematic overview of the complete state of knowledge 
concerning the criminalisation of migrants and ethnic minorities. In order to narrow the field, the paper 
focuses primarily (but not exclusively) on irregular migration. This group constitutes the prime target of the 
broader, punitive turn in the regulation of migration that has emerged, particularly in the European context, 
since the mid-1970s. Irregular immigrants are targeted by highly restrictive immigration policies that 
contribute to/construct their status of illegality, while the systematic use of criminal sanctions, together with 
administrative detention and deportation as the main policy tools in European governments’ continuing 
struggle against unauthorised immigration confers on this migrant category a “dynamic of hyper-
                                                      
* Joanna Parkin is a Researcher in the Justice and Home Affairs Section of the Centre for European Policy Studies. The 
author would like to thank Prof. Elspeth Guild, Dr. Sergio Carrera and Susanne Knickmeier for their invaluable 
comments, as well as Cristina Marcuzzo for her advice on EU-funded project research related to criminalisation of 
migration in Europe. 
1 In the United States, the Chicago School produced an important body of work which tested claims linking immigrants 
and criminality. See, for instance, Shaw and McKay (1969). 
2 In terms of EU-funded research, this paper limits its focus to a narrow category of research projects primarily carried 
out within the scope of the EU’s 6
th and 7
th Framework Programmes as well as ad hoc studies funded by various 
departments of the European Commission, European Parliament and the Fundamental Rights Agency in the past five 
years. For a further overview of the EU’s research relating to migration, see A. Singleton (2009), “Moving Europe: EU 
Research on Migration and Policy Needs”, Research Policy Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities Series. 2 | JOANNA PARKIN 
criminalisation” (De Giorgi, 2010). The criminalisation of irregular migration therefore crystallises some of 
the preeminent themes, dilemmas and questions that emerge from the broader criminalisation of migration.  
Second, this paper takes as a starting point the Statistical Review and Summary produced within the work 
package 8 of the FIDUCIA project which charted the statistical landscape covering the criminalisation of 
migration and ethnic minorities (Allodi et al, 2013). The statistical research revealed a paradox. Over-
representation of foreigners in the criminal justice systems of European member states and strong public 
perceptions linking migrants to crime, are contrasted against the lack of any concrete empirical evidence 
substantiating a correlation between immigration figures and crime rates. The paper briefly highlights a 
number of drivers which serve to fuel the ‘myths’ linking migration and crime, including factors that 
artificially amplify the statistical representation of migrants and minorities in criminal activities. These 
include the proliferation of immigration-related criminal offences, and discriminatory treatment by police, 
including ethnic profiling.   
This paper aims to build on these findings and investigate further the trends and discrepancies revealed by 
the statistics on migration and crime. It asks several key questions: to what extent does the criminalisation of 
migration represent a change or continuity with past patterns and practices? What are the driving forces 
behind these trends? How do they compare or diverge among different European member states? And what 
consequences does the criminalisation of migration bring for the individuals targeted as well as European 
societies and their criminal justice systems?   
The literature covering the criminalisation of migration is dealt with under a variety of competing 
frameworks and approaches; however it is possible to distinguish three key categories: discursive 
criminalisation; the use of criminal law for migration management; and immigrant detention. The paper is 
structured accordingly: The first section examines the ‘discursive’ dimension of the criminalisation of 
migration. It looks at how scholars have understood the role of discourses that link immigration to notions of 
crime, deviance and security and construct the figure of the migrant as a risk category. The second section 
examines the intersection between criminal law and immigration control, exploring the potential reasons 
behind the increasingly blurred distinction between criminal law and immigration law and its consequences. 
Finally, the third section explores the academic debates covering the use by governments of migration-
related sanctions falling outside of criminal law, namely detention. In each of these three categories, the 
impact of European level law, policy and official discourse is seen to have an increasingly influential role. 
Therefore, in addition to highlighting national case studies, the paper will also trace the academic literature 
examining the impact of EU policy on European trends and practices. Finally, the conclusion will identify 
the synergies and gaps in the current academic research covering the criminalisation of migration, as well as 
potential implications for trust in justice and judicial legitimacy that will be of particular relevance for on-
going FIDUCIA research. 
1.  The discursive dimension of criminalisation 
A considerable contributor to the phenomenon of criminalisation of migration takes place beyond the realm 
of criminal and administrative law and practice. What we call the ‘discursive’ dimension of criminalisation 
refers to the way in which discourses on immigration, deviance and security construct the idea of a criminal 
threat that is inexorably linked to immigrants as ‘deviant’ characters and immigration as the harbinger of 
security risks (Maneri, 2011). 
Academic literature addressing the discursive dimension of criminalisation takes a number of different 
angles and approaches, reflecting the multi-layered (linguistic, social, cultural economic and political) factors 
that affect the way in which immigration is framed and perceived in European societies. 
Yet, despite the necessarily broad scope of this topic, analysing this aspect of the criminalisation 
phenomenon is critically important. It allows us to understand the social and political conditions, as well as 
the public perceptions, which allow the construction of migrants as a risk category. A number of authors 
have made a clear link between criminalising discourse and policy-making. For instance, De Giorgi (2010) 
contends that public discourses “have become powerful catalysts for the consolidation of a punitive 
governance of migrations revolving around a process of ‘categorical criminalisation’ of immigrants”, while 
Vollmer, during his study of discursive criminalisation of irregular migration during the EU-funded THE CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE | 3 
Clandestino project,
3 identified specific examples of where political and media discourse led to very concrete 
policy measures in the policing and punishment of irregular migrants. 
The following section explores the broad themes and debates in academic scholarship concerning the 
discursive dimension of migrant criminalisation. It will set the foundation for Sections two and three, by 
asking how scholars have shed light on the processes that have led the migrant to become a primary target of 
European penal systems. What are the drivers and who are the actors behind these processes?  
1.1  Change and continuity in the criminalisation of migration 
Much of the literature on the criminalisation of migration puts the accent on the novel nature of the criminal 
turn in migration law and policy in Western countries. However, several authors have identified lines of 
continuity in the way in which the ‘outsider’ has been framed and governed throughout the centuries. Weber 
and Bowling (2008), for instance, have examined the parallels with current migration regimes in the Tudor 
control of vagrancy and 18th century poor laws in the UK, which saw administrative and criminal law 
employed to control the mobility of paupers and beggars. The incarceration and expulsion beyond the 
boundaries of the parish of such ‘undesirables’ demonstrates how the unregulated mobility of those deemed 
‘outsiders’ – both in a socio-economic and geographical sense – have long been associated with social 
unease and disorder; well before notions of identity, borders and resources were organised at the national 
level.  
Bridget Anderson (2013) too, has historicised the migration challenge, charting the development of state 
control and criminalisation of, first, poor people within the territorial boundaries of a realm, then later of 
non-citizens outside the state. This historical perspective is useful, in that it contextualises assumptions 
concerning sovereignty, citizenship and the state, and highlights the necessity for any analysis of the 
criminalisation of migration to consider questions of socio-economic status and the organisation of labour 
(see also Melossi, 2003).  
Most emblematic of these trends perhaps, is the figure of the Roma, who has come to embody the mobile, 
‘vagrant’, ‘outsider’ and the consequent threat of social disorder that these qualities imply. Sigona and 
Trehan (2011) describe how the construction of Roma as a people racially predisposed to crime, vagrancy 
and idleness has been centuries in the making, highlighting the deep-rooted nature of assumptions and 
framings that link migrants with crime, but also the racialisation of the migrant/crime association, especially 
for visible minorities. Indeed, when examining the discursive aspects covering the criminalisation of 
migration, the boundaries between migration, race and ethnicity are often highly blurred.  
Despite the long historical concern of governments to deter, control and incarcerate the mobile, there is a 
wide consensus among scholars that the criminalisation of migration has intensified in Western Europe in the 
last three decades, echoing the situation in the United States (Vollmer, 2011; De Giorgio, 2010; Huysmans, 
2006; Bigo, 2004; Melossi, 2003). What has driven this change? 
Insight into this question is provided by Salvadore Palidda’s study of the racial criminalisation of migrants 
and minorities across Europe and the US, drawing on research conducted as part of the EU-funded 
CRIMPREV project.
4  Interestingly, Palidda (2011) finds that intensification of criminalisation trends in 
specific national contexts is not linked to increases in crime rates or immigration. He finds no correlation in 
the criminalisation of aliens and rises in crime, while periods of high immigration often see no marked 
change in criminalisation trends. Rather, he notes that periods of economic difficulty often see the fiercest 
proliferation of criminalisation discourses and surges of xenophobia. 
                                                      
3 CLANDESTINO (Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable Data and Trends Across Europe) was an EU-
funded collaborative research project financed under the EU’s 6
th Framework Programme that aimed to support policy-
makers in designing and implementing appropriate policies regarding undocumented migration (see 
http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/).  
4 The CRIMPREV (Assessing Deviance, Crime and Prevention in Europe) Project was a European Commission funded 
research project financed under the EU’s 6
th Framework Programme. The project aimed to produce a European 
comparative assessment of: factors of deviant behaviours; processes of criminalisation; perceptions of crime; links 
between illegal or socially deviant behaviour and organised crime; and public policies of prevention (see 
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The correlation between criminalisation trends and periods of economic crisis finds synergies with Dario 
Melossi’s thesis that the criminalisation and penalisation of migrants is primarily driven by moments of 
‘crisis’ – economic, political and social. Melossi (2003), alongside other academics including Bigo (2004) 
and De Giorgi (2010), chart an intensification in public discourses concerning migration and security at a 
moment when politicians were encountering the economic challenges and urban crises beginning in the mid-
1970s, when post-Fordist processes of globalisation and re-structuring of the economy led to considerable 
social dislocation. As Melossi notes, this hypothesis is consistent with the research on racism and 
xenophobia, which shows that the degree of xenophobic tensions are driven more by the perception of the 
threat posed by immigrants than by actual economic competition; a perception that is intensified by moments 
of social or economic crisis. Similarly, Bigo finds that: 
“The immigrant, considered beneficial in a period of economic growth, acquires a negative image 
during economic recession, ruining the welfare state by fraudulently claiming social security benefits 
and unemployment benefit…the image of the immigrant merges into that of the unemployed, the 
thief, the smuggler and the criminal – an image used by parties of the extreme right.” (2003, p. 70)  
To understand better how this process plays out, it is necessary to examine more closely literature on the 
development of public discourse surrounding crime and migration and the role of media and political 
institutions in shaping it. 
1.2  Crime and migration in public discourse 
Before examining the debates in academic scholarship on the role of media and public discourse, it is useful 
to first address the question of terminology. Several authors (Anderson, 2013; Düvell 2011; Vollmer 2011; 
Maneri, 2011; Guild, 2004) have pointed to the linguistic dimension of criminalisation and the implications it 
has for public perception and policy-making. As Maneri (2011) states, the “use of ‘collective categories’ that 
lack any descriptive coherence or precision, but are nevertheless replete with connotations and implicit 
associations (‘clandestine’, ‘gypsies’, ‘extracomunatari’, ‘Muslims,’ etc.) provide the raw material for the 
discourse on immigration.”  
The term ‘illegal migrant’ is a prime example of such a collective category. This term is not only misleading 
in that confers a criminal status on individuals whose only ‘crime’ is the administrative misdemeanor of 
lacking the proper documentation to authorise their presence/administrative status on a territory (Guild, 
2004). It also collapses a highly complex question (about who is illegal and who is not) into a simplified 
construct. As both Bridget Anderson (2013) and Franck Düvell (2011) point out, there are a huge number of 
permutations and eventualities that lead to an irregular status, including overstaying a visa or breaking the 
complex conditions of entry (e.g. on employment) – a scenario which Ruhs and Anderson (2010) have 
referred to as leading to a status of ‘semi-compliance.’ This status of semi-compliance undermines the 
presumption of a straightforward binary opposition between ‘illegal’ and ‘legal’ migration. Nevertheless, and 
despite a recent counter-shift away from such terminology,
5 the use of terms such as ‘illegal’, ‘clandestine’ 
or ‘clandestino’ are still widely employed in both official and unofficial discourse, with their inherent 
implications of secrecy, deviance and criminality. Consequently, such language confers a stigma of suspicion 
on all migrants: the ‘double punishment’ described by Sayad (2004) and pursued by Marcello Maneri who 
characterises this stigma as lying “precisely in his or her ontological delinquency, in not being a neutral 
entity but rather a presence that constitutes a latent crime that is brought to light only once it is committed.” 
(2011, p. 88). 
A number of EU-funded research projects undertaken in recent years have also studied the negative 
implications of using criminal categories to describe irregular migrants (see Annex 1). For instance, the 
project Undocumented Worker Transitions (UWT)
6 found that terms like ‘undocumented’, ‘irregular’, ‘semi-
                                                      
5  For instance, in April 2013 the Associated Press decided to stop using the term “illegal” to describe a person, 
reserving the term only for an action, such as entering or residing in a country illegally. Certain EU institutional actors, 
such as the Cecilia Malmstrom, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, have also promoted the use of alternative 
terminology.  
6 The UWT project was funded by the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission’s DG Research and 
was coordinated by the Working Lives Research Institute at London Metropolitan University with partners across seven 
member states. The project touched light on the experiences of undocumented workers in Europe, their working 
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compliant’ and ‘non-compliant’ are more value neutral – and therefore preferable – to that of ‘illegal 
immigrants’. Similarly the CHALLENGE
7 and CRIMPREV projects have examined how the use of this 
language connects the status of irregular migrants with criminality and security risk, facilitating restrictive 
policies and practices by public authorities by framing undocumented persons as ‘non-rights holders’ and 
even as ‘non-persons’ (Carrera and Merlino, 2009). Indeed, the use of such evocative categories by 
journalists and politicians pre-empts the policy approach to deal with such ‘deviance’. Thus it becomes 
legitimate for ‘illegal immigration’ to be ‘fought’, and ‘clandestins’ or ‘clandestinos’ to be controlled and 
detained.  
Other scholars have focused in more detail on the actors driving public discourse, looking primarily at the 
role of media and politicians. For instance, Tsoukala (2005), focusing mainly on the cases of Greece and 
Italy, finds that the discursive framing of migrants as bearers of social threat rests on specific categories of 
rhetoric which are expressed more and more openly by politicians, officials and the media and which are 
articulated around three principle axes: a socio-economic principle; a securitarian principle and an identity 
principle. Vollmer, drawing on Clandestino research, found that the threat dimension in discourses on 
immigration vary in degree and nature across the EU. France, for instance, has seen a heavy emphasis on 
crime and security while in Austria public discourses on irregular immigration have focused more on the 
welfare and resources impact.  Nevertheless, he found the existence of a discursive element of threat (and its 
influence on policy-making) throughout all European discourses: in northern, southern and central European 
countries. Similarly, a study across seven European countries (Austria, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland) carried out by the EU-funded project “Support and Opposition to 
Migration” (SOM)
8 found ‘security and crime’ to be the most frequent theme in discourses of politicians and 
journalists when addressing the topic of immigration (Berkhout, 2012). 
Maneri’s examination of public discourse on immigration in Italy finds a symbiosis of interests and mutually 
reinforcing interactions between media and politics. Television and print media increase the saleability of a 
news item by emphasising the threatening elements and by using the frame of emergency. While the media 
raise the alarm, other institutional actors are eager to exploit a symbolic threat and to validate, support and 
channel that threat towards certain targets. The result is a pattern of news coverage that sees cycles of 
attention focusing on crime news involving foreigners and which quickly assume the characteristics of a 
moral panic, often leading to enhanced police activities and the introduction of administrative decrees and 
special legislation (Maneri, 2011).    
From this analysis, we deduce that a number of social institutions are driven by their own diverse but 
overlapping reasons to amplify the problems associated with immigration. Mass media, politicians and police 
find that (irregular) immigrants provide a convenient target. For police, irregular migrants represent an easily 
recognised means of meeting quotas for arrests and demonstrating action in a ‘problem area’ where there is 
social consensus (Vollmer, 2011); the press find a useful ‘enemy’ figure, playing on public fears of crime 
and anxiety surrounding dwindling societal resources as a means to increase profit margins. This has been 
found to be the case, particularly in those European countries where journalists have a freer hand to set the 
news agenda, such as the tabloid press in the UK (Berkhout, 2012). For politicians, immigration offers a 
platform where messages are transmitted relatively easily to the public: talking tough on illegal immigration 
is more straightforward for instance than explaining/distinguishing a party’s economic policies or stance on 
foreign affairs. The result is a convergence of interests that sets in place a “complex systemic machine” 
(Melossi, 2003) driving a criminalising discourse around the figure of the migrant or foreigner. 
1.3 Securitisation of migration 
The role of specific actors in driving the criminalisation of migration is also explored by scholarship from the 
field of security studies, this time focusing on the role of security professionals and security agencies in 
                                                      
7 CHALLENGE was a 5-year integrated research project financed under the EU’s 6
th Framework Programme and 
coordinated by the Justice and Home Affairs Section of the Centre for European Policy Studies and Sciences Po, Paris. 
It involved 23 universities and research centres from across the EU and aimed at facilitating a more responsive 
assessment of the rules and practices of security in Europe (see www.libertysecurity.org).  
8 SOM (Support and Opposition to Migration) is a collaborative project funded by the European Commission as part of 
the Seventh Framework Programme examining the politicisation of migration in seven European countries. For more 
information see http://www.som-project.eu/.  6 | JOANNA PARKIN 
driving the discursive construction of migrants as a ‘risk’ category.
9  Prominent among these authors, Didier 
Bigo (2002) has described the creation of a continuum of threats by security professionals, which has 
transformed the traditional notions of security (associated with struggles against terrorists, criminals, spies 
and counterfeiters) towards other targets, including people crossing borders or individuals born to foreign 
parents. This process is driven by the direct interests of security professionals (national police forces, 
customs, intelligence services, consulates and security industries) to problematise certain social phenomena 
in the pursuit of power, influence and in the competition for budgets and resources of their services and is 
facilitated by the transformation of technologies they use (large-scale surveillance databases, data profiling 
etc).  
The resulting securitisation of migration (Balzacq, 2010; Huysmans, 2006; Stumpf, 2007) therefore creates a 
series of ‘new migratory threats.’ These threats, once framed as such by security agencies, are allocated a 
particular weight and legitimacy, because the professionals that propagate them occupy an established 
position and are invested with a (supposed) privileged knowledge.  
A concrete example of the securitisation of migration in practice is the increasing conflation of irregular 
migration with organised crime phenomena, particularly smuggling and trafficking (Grewcock, 2003). This 
supposition is supported by field research of the Clandestino project which found that UK Border Agency 
officials display a tendency to overestimate the role of smuggling in irregular migration to the UK.
10  The 
discursive association of irregular entry with smuggling communicates to the public that controlling this kind 
movement is an immense challenge, since authorities are not up against humble individuals but organised 
criminal networks, which increases the task to a new level of difficulty and danger (Vollmer, 2011).  
Indeed, this desire to demonstrate efficiency is explored by the securitisation literature, which highlights the 
paradox in the tendency by governments to roll out ever more visible and costly migration control measures, 
whose efficacy is strongly questioned (Cornelius, 2005). Ever tighter border controls are not only expensive 
but counter-productive. Evidence from the Clandestino project (among other sources) indicates that most 
irregular migrants achieve this status through overstaying a visa not via clandestine entry (Düvell, 2011). 
Moreover, coercive border controls force border-crossers into ever more dangerous forms of travel 
(Spijkerboer, 2007), and encourage those who manage to overcome them to prolong their stay (Castles, 
2006). As migration controls could not become efficient without putting at risk (some would argue, even 
greater risk) the democratic values specific to European countries as well as their budgets, public policies 
with regard to security and immigration have become effectively symbolic (Bigo, 2004). As described by 
Weber and Bowling: “The Gatekeeper state seeks to maintain its currency as a provider of protection from 
suspect mobilities, even though building walls within a ‘space of flows’ is increasingly futile.” (2008, p. 360) 
1.4  The EU dimension of discursive criminalisation 
Literature delineating the securitisation of migration and its link to crime fighting gain particular salience 
when examining the EU dimension, and the Europeanisation of discourses surrounding the ‘criminal 
migrant’. Moreover, the shifting of focus to the European level opens a new set of questions over who are the 
actors responsible for driving the discursive governance of migration? Who is targeted and how are risk 
categories constructed? 
Didier Bigo charts how the establishment of Schengen and EU free movement was underpinned by a strong 
discursive component driven by police and security experts, who argued that that the abolition of border 
controls would constitute a major security deficit (Bigo, 1996). The notion that European integration via the 
opening of internal borders would lead to an increase in crime and more mobile criminal organised groups 
became the shared belief underpinning Schengen and has served to justify the proliferation of a range of 
compensatory security measures and transnational cooperation in policing and border enforcement (Faure-
Atger, 2008). These include the establishment of new European security agencies, such as Europol and 
                                                      
9 Such a theoretical approach has developed out of the ‘securitisation theory’ literature of the Copenhagen School. 
Whereas the Copenhagen School focus on the role of ‘speech acts’ in the construction of security threats, more recently 
scholars, such as Didier Bigo and Jeff Huysmans, have shifted the emphasis away from discourse-centred processes to 
the role of actors, networks and technologies in driving securitisation processes. 
10 According to an officer of the UKBA, it is estimated that more than 75% of all ‘illegal’ border-crossers made their 
way into the UK by using the assistance of smugglers. The EU-funded Clandestino project (on which Vollmer’s 
research was based) found such estimates to be a rather unrealistic percentage. THE CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE | 7 
Frontex, whose role in creating knowledge on migration-related risks and consolidating official EU discourse 
linking migration to a continuum of threats (human smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism) has been 
explored in an earlier FIDUCIA deliverable (Parkin, 2012). The knowledge and activities generated by these 
new actors in the criminalisation of migration in turn serve to legitimate the pan-European integration project 
and the need for transnational governance of crime and security. Consequently, border security and irregular 
immigration have become ‘urgent challenges’ and actions to combat them are strategic priorities within the 
EU’s Internal Security Strategy (Parkin, 2012; Guild and Carrera, 2011). 
Indeed, preventing cross-border crime has been, on the discursive level of policy formation, the prime 
justification for the creation of a series of European surveillance systems, such as the Schengen Information 
System (I and II), the Visa Information System, EURODAC, and EUROSUR to name but a few (Aas, 2011). 
Although ostensibly serving different functions, what these large-scale databases have in common is 
monitoring and controlling the mobility of non-EU citizens. Irregular migration has even become the primary 
area of activity for the Schengen Information System, which was ostensibly created to detect and immobilise 
criminals crossing EU external borders (Parkin, 2011). These EU surveillance systems have not only come to 
embody the convergence of crime control and migration control at the European level, they also provide an 
ideal example of the selective identification of risk categories. As Aas has argued, these EU “cross-border 
surveillance networks…embody the changing modes of risk thinking and social exclusion, and are inscribed 
with specific notions of otherness and suspicion” (2011, p. 332).  
2.  Intersections between criminal law and migration management 
The second manifestation of the criminalisation of migration is evidenced through the increasing 
intersections between criminal law and migration management. Where regulation of immigration has in the 
past primarily taken place in the civil sphere, the increasing use of criminal provisions in immigration law is 
beginning to attract the attention of both migration scholars and criminologists, who have expressed surprise 
at this turn in criminal justice systems: traditionally criminal law seeks to prevent and address harm to 
individuals and society that stems from fraud, violence and evil motive (Sendor in Stumpf, 2007) while 
immigration law decides who may cross and border and reside in a territory. How then do scholars 
understand the increasing merger between these two fields, and what are the implications for individuals as 
well as the consequences for criminal justice?  
2.1 Intersections  between  criminal law and migration management in Europe 
Scholarship exploring the intersections between criminal justice and migration control is a great deal more 
developed in the United States than in Europe, where reflection and debates on the so-called ‘crimmigration 
law’ phenomena are still at an early stage (Aliverti, 2012; Chacon, 2012; Sklanksy, 2012; Stumpf, 2007).  
In the European context, Ana Aliverti (2012) has conducted some of the most extensive research on the rise 
of criminal offences at the core of immigration law in the UK, which has a long-standing history of using 
criminal penalties to punish immigration related offences but which has nevertheless seen a dramatic 
intensification of the use of criminal law in its migration policy during the past two decades (Webber, 2008). 
Italian specificities have also been explored, including from a migration perspective, with authors 
investigating the marked prohibitionist and securitarian approach to immigration law (Palidda, 2011; 
Merlino, 2009). However, a genuine cross-comparative analysis of the use of criminal law to manage 
immigration across different European national contexts is currently lacking. Nevertheless, research exists 
that can be drawn upon to make some general observations on the use of criminal law provisions in 
immigration enforcement in Europe. These intersections can be divided into two essential categories. First, 
‘crimes’ that only foreigners can commit, and second, ‘crimes’ that are committed by those assisting 
irregular migrants. 
In the first category falls the crime of irregular entry and stay. The research project ‘Fundamental Rights of 
Irregular Migrants in an Irregular Situation’ funded by the EU’s fundamental Rights Agency and carried out 
by a network of academic researchers in 2010, made a systematic assessment of the legislation governing 
irregular migration across the (then) 27 EU member states (FRA, 2011). The project found that in 17 
member states irregular border crossing or irregular stay is, at least on paper, considered a criminal offence, 
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administrative offence, or a crime only under certain conditions. For instance, in the Netherlands, an 
irregular migrant who is apprehended repeatedly for illegal residence or who has been convicted of certain 
crimes can be declared an undesirable alien by the Ministry of Justice, for whom continued residence in the 
Netherlands is regarded as a crime against the state, punishable by up to 6 months imprisonment (Leerkes 
and Broeders, 2010).  
In addition to entry and unauthorised stay/residence, other crimes committed by foreigners include re-entry 
into a country from which the individual has been banned, the forging or possession of false visas or identity 
documents and unauthorised employment. There are also those crimes whose punishments are significantly 
increased when they involve foreigners, for instance the refusal to show identity documents to a law 
enforcement officer in those countries where not carrying ID is unlawful. 
The second category of criminal penalties are targeted at those accused of assisting irregular migrants. 
Sanctions cover the act of assisting illegal entry (including carrier liability penalties for transporting 
undocumented migrants, for failing to supply full passenger information or for failing to prevent 
unauthorised disembarkation), for employing migrants unauthorised to work, and for providing humanitarian 
assistance to those fleeing persecution (otherwise known as ‘humanitarian smuggling’.) For instance, in the 
UK the maximum sentence for assisting people to breach immigration law doubled to 14 years from seven 
when the offence was first introduced, the same as the maximum offence for human trafficking, although 
there are marked differences between these two activities (Webber, 2008). 
These criminal offences covering third countries in some member states come alongside ‘duties to report’, 
which oblige service providers (e.g. schools, healthcare providers) as well as private agents to report the 
presence of undocumented migrants to authorities. In Germany these reporting obligations have elicited 
particular discussion. Following concerns from civil society movements the German federal legislation on 
reporting duties was revised and softened in 2011, exempting educational facilities and healthcare providers, 
although it remains in force for other public services such as social welfare offices (FRA, 2011). Although 
usually these ‘duties to report’ constitute obligations under civil law, in rare cases the violation of such 
obligations imply criminal penalties. For instance, Dutch law contains a provision that obliges persons who 
shelter migrants in an irregular situation to inform the authorities. Breach of this obligation implies a fine of 
3, 350 EUR or 6 months imprisonment (FRA, 2011). The result of this second category of penalties is that 
various groups from the public and private sector are co-opted into the role of border or law enforcement 
agents, obliged to police the mobility or actions of irregular migrants or to report their presence to the 
authorities if they are to avoid sanctions themselves. 
Trends towards the use of criminal sanctions for migration control in member states’ domestic laws have 
been accompanied by a similar shift in EU legislation. Scholars of EU migration law have noted that while 
the overwhelming majority of measures within the EU acquis on irregular immigration are targeted towards 
increasing the surveillance and control of the EU’s external borders and enforcing the return of irregular 
migrants, a number of instruments also establish administrative and penal sanctions for third parties – 
including facilitators, carriers and employers – involved in the irregular immigration process (Carrera and 
Merlino, 2009).  
In particular, at EU level the use of criminal law sanctions for individuals directly or indirectly involved in 
irregular migration process include the Facilitation Directive (2002/90/EC), which imposes on states the duty 
to penalise those who, for financial gain, intentionally assist an irregular migrant to enter and/or reside in the 
EU. This could also cover landlords who rent accommodation to irregular migrants. The Employers 
Sanctions Directive (2009/52/EC) meanwhile lays down common minimum standards on sanctions to be 
applied by the EU member states to employers violating the ban on employment of “illegally staying third 
country nationals”. One of the core objectives of the Directive is to deter irregular immigration by tackling 
undeclared work. According to the Directive, employers who cannot show that they have undertaken certain 
checks before recruiting a third country national will be liable to fines and other administrative measures. 
The use of criminal penalties is foreseen in the case of repeated infringements, employment of significant 
numbers of irregular staff, particularly exploitative working conditions or knowingly employing victims of 
human trafficking or minors. 
Literature on the Europeanisation on the criminalisation of migration, drawn from migration or securitisation 
studies and the field of migration law, examines how EU law-making can directly impel a restrictive stance 
in the criminal law of its member states. Webber notes increasing convergence in European legislation and 
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cooperation (2006). Foblets and Vanheule (2006), for instance, cite how the transposition of the EU’s Family 
Reunification Directive into Belgian law led to the introduction of criminal penalties to combat so-called 
‘marriages of convenience’. Scholten and Minderhoud (2008), drawing on research conducted within the 
framework of the EU-funded CHALLENGE project, demonstrate that the process of influence is bi-
directional, as member states upload their national approaches to the European level, or even use the EU law-
making sphere as a venue to introduce controversial legislation that otherwise would meet resistance in 
national policy-making procedures. For instance, where the Dutch government met with parliamentary 
opposition in introducing criminal penalties for carriers found to bring irregular migrants onto national 
territory, the Netherlands turned instead to the EU level and was able to introduce a system of carrier 
sanctions by promoting the adoption of a Carrier Sanctions Directive (2001/51/EC) in EU negotiations, 
enabling it to bring criminal prosecutions and levy millions of euro in fines against airlines such as KLM.  
2.2  Functions of criminal law in immigration enforcement 
How does the literature explain the trends outlined above? What are the rationales driving the tendency to 
resort to criminal law for migration management objectives and what functions does criminal law play in 
immigration control? 
The first possible explanation can be found in academic literature on migration control, which contends that 
the state seeks new means of exerting control over migration flows, both at the border and within state 
boundaries (Cornelius, 2005; Cornelius et al, 2004). States have increasingly pushed the limits of 
immigration law and policy in recent years in their quest to act as gatekeepers of human mobility, for 
instance expanding into foreign affairs diplomacy in order to control migration before individuals even arrive 
at state frontiers (Carrera et al, 2011). From this perspective, criminal law can be seen to offer new 
possibilities to enforce migration control when immigration law and policy reaches its limits.   
However, scholars such as Aliverti (2012) and Broeders, (2010) have noted that the general underuse of 
enforcement powers presents a problem with the migration control thesis when applied to ‘crimmigration’. 
For instance, in the UK (which has seen some of the most expansive use of criminal law in the policing of 
foreigners), 67, 215 people were subject to removal and voluntary departure in 2009 while only 549 people 
were proceeded against and 433 were convicted of immigration offences (Home Office, 2010 in Aliverti, 
2012). Scholars have also noted the underuse of sanctions against third party agents such as employers as an 
example of under-enforcement. 
Indeed, the fact that prosecution of immigration offences under criminal law is usually discretionary and 
often a means of last resort, indicates that there may be more complex factors at play driving the expansion 
of criminal law into the domain of immigration enforcement (or vice versa). An answer may be found in 
literature on the securitisation of migration, which stresses that government approaches that re-construct 
questions of mobility and migration under the rubric of security and crime often have a symbolic, rather than 
an effective, rationale (see Section 1.3 above). A similar appeal to the symbolic power of criminal law can be 
found in the literature on the new culture of criminal justice (see for example, Garland, 2001; Garland, 
1996). Garland has posited that states increasingly resort to adopting more criminal legislation, in spite – or 
even because of – their limited margin of manouevre for dealing with contemporary social challenges, as a 
symbolic, or communicative act. The targets of the messages sent by the enactment of new criminal 
legislation are both the citizenry, who are to find reassurance in the power of the state to secure their 
continued protection from crime and deviance, but also the potential deviants themselves. Indeed, scholars of 
criminology contend that the deterrence function of criminal law is gaining ground above the traditional 
emphasis on retribution (Steiker in Aliverti, 2012). However, while the symbolic or communicative 
(‘message sending’) function of policy is a recurring theme in the migration debate it is rarely unpacked and 
tested against concrete case studies. The intended recipients of such messages; how these messages are 
interpreted and how in turn such policies themselves act on and shape the public and political debate are 
under-explored questions that warrant further research. 
Much of the contribution of criminal law scholars in this field has situated the ‘crimmigration’ trend as part 
of a broader phenomenon of criminal law expansion that has been conducted in the US and Western Europe 
during the past two decades (Alverti, 2012; Sklansky, 2012; Chacon, 2012; Duff, 2010). This thesis posits 
that so-called “crimmigration…simply replicates in the context of immigration what we have already 
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criminal law.” (Sklansky, 2012). The UK here would be a case in point: between 1997 – 2009 the New 
Labour government introduced a total of 84 new immigration offences (Aliverti, 2012).   
Sklansky (2012) argues that the process of criminalisation is driven by what he terms ‘ad hoc 
instrumentalism’. By this he means the general sense that the bounds of criminal law should be set 
pragmatically, not philosophically. Debates about whether to criminalise a certain behaviour are therefore 
dominated by questions of whether criminal enforcement ‘works’ and not whether a certain practice deserves 
to be criminalised. This way of thinking is linked to the broader tendency to see law as instrumental. 
Sklanky’s thesis would appear to be supported by the research conducted by Ana Aliverti in her 
investigations on the use of criminal law in immigration enforcement by the UK Border Agency (2012). 
Aliverti found that the reproduction of criminal provisions in immigration laws in the UK in recent years is 
partly driven by symbolic motivations to demonstrate the states’ control over immigration flows. But it is 
also to a great extent the outcome of the pragmatic and strategic use of the criminal law in everyday 
enforcement practices. She argues that from this perspective, “the criminalisation of migration appears to be 
a mundane, bureaucratic and repetitive exercise of criminal powers geared by convenience and efficiency in 
delivering outcomes rather than to represent a punitive rationale to sanction morally wrong conducts.” 
2.3  Consequences of ‘crimmigration’ law 
What are the effects of the increasing intersection between criminal law and immigration control?  
Scholarship highlights a number of unintended consequences resulting from so-called crimmigration trends. 
The first set of effects, dealt with primarily by the migration studies literature, focuses on the consequences 
for the individuals targeted while the criminology scholarship has focused primarily on the implications of 
these trends for criminal justice systems and criminal law. 
Turning first to the implications for individuals. Although there has been little in-depth academic research 
devoted to this topic, a number of authors, particularly those drawing on work conducted as part of EU-
funded research projects, have highlighted some of the negative consequences resulting from 
‘crimmigration’ laws on individual migrants (see Annex 1). The FRA research project on fundamental rights 
of migrants in an irregular situation, for instance, found that duties to report imposed on service providers, as 
well as direct police enforcement practices (e.g. police operations targeting irregular migrants outside 
schools and hospitals)
11  acted as barriers to migrants accessing basic social rights such as housing, 
healthcare, and education. Consequently, the Book of Solidarity project (Providing Assistance to 
Undocumented Migrants)
12 found that irregular migrants rely to a large extent on social networks (migrant 
communities, social and political activists, NGOs, church groups etc.) to access basic social rights. Policy 
analysis by the CHALLENGE project meanwhile has argued that the use of criminal law to target employers 
may have counter-productive effects on employment and working conditions (Carrera and Guild, 2007). The 
penal framework established by the EU Employers Sanctions Directive could have harmful effects in terms 
of guaranteeing employment security and preventing exploitation. Moreover, by dissuading employers from 
hiring third country nationals for fear of incurring sanctions, the Directive could ultimately harm the 
employment prospects of third country nationals in the EU.  
Studies have also found that police targeting of irregular migrants via identity checks often led to racial and 
ethnic profiling (see FRA, 2011). Writing from a US perspective, Chacon (2012) argues that converting 
immigration enforcement into a criminal problem fuels and sanctions racial profiling by police. Further, the 
EU-funded CRIMPREV project found that the practice of singling out visible minorities for police controls 
not only consolidates the association of criminality and deviance around irregular migrants it also artificially 
inflates the statistics on foreign crimes more generally (Palidda, 2011). A concrete example of this process is 
provided by Mucchielli and Nevanen’s study of the penal treatment of foreigners in France (2011). The 
authors found that pressure on French police to demonstrate improvement in performance led them to focus 
on crimes that bring ‘higher yields’ in terms of successful stops and arrests. Consequently, 2001 – 2007 saw 
                                                      
11 As reported by civil society survey respondents in Cypus, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain. 
12 The Book of Solidarity project (Providing Assistance to Undocumented Migrants) was funded by the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities and coordinated by 
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a drive by the police to target irregular migrants resulting in significant growth in the number of foreigners 
reported in France, with 70% of that increase accounted for by ‘illegal’ immigration.  
The resulting fear and distrust by migrant communities towards police further enhances their vulnerability, 
dissuading migrants who may have been subjected to violence or exploitation from coming forward and 
reporting crimes against them (FRA, 2011). Both the EU-funded CLANDESTINO and EUMARGINS
13 
projects conclude that there is a strong likelihood that the use of criminal legislation and over-policing serve 
to drive migrants into “informal, shadow and niche activities” (Duvell, 2011; see also Kallas et al., 2011).  
The over-policing of migrants may also have wider spillover effects, beyond the impact on the individual, 
potentially bringing important implications for levels of trust in police among certain sections of European 
societies, such as migrant or ethnic minority communities. Research indicates that trust and confidence in 
policing is rooted in the public’s estimation of procedural fairness and alignment of moral values (Jackson 
and Bradford, 2010). If certain social groups feel themselves singled out for excessive surveillance, or 
experience negative treatment at the hands of police authorities, this could undermine the fairness, 
engagement and relationship between police and public which underpin trust in justice and judicial 
legitimacy. Hence, in a case study of ethnic minorities and trust in criminal justice in France, the EU-funded 
Euro-Justis project found significantly higher levels of distrust by ethnic minority communities versus 
majority communities which was found to be linked to policing styles and over-use of stop and searches 
techniques (Roux, Roché and Astor, 2011). Consequently, a significant proportion of individuals from ethnic 
minority communities viewed police patrols in their neighbourhood as an ‘intrusion’ or a ‘threat’. When 
taken further, such an erosion of trust between police and societal groups can cause a shift from a 
relationship of cooperation into one of opposition and adversarial relations.   
The relationship between criminal law and social exclusion is a subject much explored in the criminological 
literature, however its focus has primarily been on the processes and consequences of exclusion for citizens 
of a society rather than ‘outsiders’. This is clearly a gap in current criminological literature and deserves 
further examination, particularly as to whether criminal law plays a role in defining or redefining ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’ via the creation of laws for which only non-citizens may be punished.  
Nevertheless, a growing number of scholars from the field of criminology have begun to explore the 
implications of the ‘crimmigration’ trend for criminal law and for basic principles underpinning criminal 
justice (Zedner 2013; Aliverti, 2012; Chacon, 2012; Sklansky, 2012; Legomsky, 2007). 
Lucia Zedner discusses the way in which the insertion of immigration ‘crimes’ within criminal law results in 
the creation of offences that breach fundamental principles of the criminal law. According to Zedner, three 
core principles are put at risk: the basic requirement of fair warning (that people should be given adequate 
notice of a legal requirement so that they can adjust their conduct to accord with it); the culpability 
requirement; and the criminalisation condition that serious harm, or prospective harm, is caused by the 
offender. Indeed, with regard to the latter, criminal law scholars argue that immigration offences are not 
serious wrongs and are essentially victimless (Aliverti, 2012). Zedner thus contends that these breaches, 
taken together, “raise profound questions about the justifiability of criminalizing illegalities by immigrants 
where these do not meet the basic precepts of criminalisation” (Zedner, 2013). 
David Sklansky (2012), examining the peculiar development and application of ‘crimmigration law’ – what 
he has termed ‘ad hoc instrumentalism (see discussion in section 2.2 above) – also raises his concerns. His 
principal critique centres around the impact on political accountability. He argues that the blurred boundaries 
between criminal justice and immigration enforcement, the multiple actors involved and their overlapping 
responsibilities, complicates efforts to hold criminal and immigration officials accountable through political 
oversight and public pressure. Sklansky also argues that crimmigration law and the instrumental, ad hoc 
fashion that it is applied and enforced licenses low-level discretion that challenges rule of law principles such 
as legal certainty.  
This argument is further pursued by Ana Aliverti (2012) who focuses on the highly discretionary way in 
which immigration offences are enforced in the UK (similar discretionary application of criminal law 
                                                      
13 EUMARGINS (On the Margins of the European Community) is a collaborative project financed by The Seventh 
Framework Programme for research and technological development (FP7) of the European Union. The research focus is 
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governing immigration control has been noted in Italy – see Anderson, 2013). Aliverti contends that the 
often arbitrary way that criminal sanctions are applied against immigration ‘offenders’ reveals just how 
contested and ambiguous the category of immigration offences is. Again, she posits that current trends and 
practice threaten principles of legal certainty, equal treatment and proportionality. This leads her to conclude 
that: 
“Criminal law as a specific mode of legal regulation should be reserved for the most serious wrongs. 
Further, because the goal is to eject immigration offenders from the country, criminal sanctions 
against immigrants are emptied of any normative function and are unjustified. Not only is the formal 
enactment of immigration offences in conflict with various criminal law principles, the actual 
enforcement of these offences is discretionary and random, casting doubts on the alleged generalised 
feature of the criminalisation of immigration and making criminal law highly unpredictable.” 
Aliverti’s assertion that the normative justification of criminal law in immigration control is weak, and 
therefore should have no role to play in migration matters is one that is broadly supported in the criminal law 
literature. However, an interesting counterpoint is provided by the reminder from certain criminologists that 
not all reductions in the scope of criminalisation necessarily equal less restrictive or more proportionate 
regimes. For instance, Duff cautions that when considering the use of administrative measures to curtail 
wrong-doing, we should rather prefer criminalisation which at least “requires public proof of determinate 
wrong-doing before liberty is curtailed, and subjects any such curtailment to requirements of proportionality” 
(Duff, 2010, p. 295). The above discussion on the limits of ‘crimmigration’ law unfortunately shows how 
those safeguards normally attributed to criminal law are often, in the case of immigration offences, left to the 
wayside. Nevertheless, the wider point concerning the normative role of procedural safeguards in criminal 
law and their absence in the system of administrative measures comes to the fore when we consider the third 
principal manifestation of migrant criminalisation: immigrant detention. 
3.  Detention of migrants 
All European Union member states practice some form of immigrant detention, by which we mean “the 
deprivation of liberty under administrative law for reasons that are directly linked to the administration of 
immigration policies” (Cornelisse, 2010, p. 4). Across the EU, detention for purposes of immigration 
enforcement has increased substantially over the past decade. The following section will explore the 
academic debates that explore the trends, drivers and effects of this phenomenon.   
3.1  Trends and practices in the use of administrative detention 
In most European countries the incarceration of migrants for migration related reasons is defined as 
administrative detention. This means that it is a measure that does not formally constitute a punishment and 
does not require conviction of a crime (Leerkes and Broeders, 2010). Nevertheless, although many scholars 
use the term ‘administrative detention’ to designate incarceration for purposes of immigration control, in 
many member states the precise boundary between detention as an administrative or penal measure is not so 
clear cut. This is partly due to the interaction between criminal proceedings on the one hand (e.g. the foreign 
detainee may initially have been apprehended on criminal charges) and administrative procedures governing 
detention and expulsion on the other. In addition, some member states do not make a clear distinction 
between those detention facilities that form part of the penal system and those that are reserved for 
individuals falling under immigration proceedings. Thus, where certain member states, such as the UK, 
restrict immigrant detention to specially allocated ‘removal centres’, in countries including France, Germany 
and Greece, migrants are regularly incarcerated in penitentiary institutions, prisons and police custody 
(Cornelisse, 2010).  
In gaining a broad overview of the framework governing the use of detention in the EU, Elspeth Guild 
provides one of the most comprehensive summaries in a report produced for the European Parliament (Guild, 
2005). In her “Typology of different types of centres in Europe” she distinguishes four scenarios under 
which a person may find themselves in administrative detention. The first covers detention on arrival, 
provided for in most EU member states’ national legislation as a means to prevent unauthorised entry or 
ascertain whether grounds for lawful entry have been met. This form of detention often takes place in transit 
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use of so-called zones d’attente of which there are more than 100 in the country (Mucchielli and Nevanen, 
2011). 
The second category covers the use of detention as part of the asylum system, whereby individuals are 
detained in reception centres while their application for asylum is assessed. However, Cornelisse notes a 
wide diversity of member state practices with regard to this form of detention. In some national contexts 
individuals are detained for a matter of days while authorities decide whether they have legitimate grounds to 
lodge a claim (e.g. Portugal), in others they are detained after they have received a negative decision and 
their detention serves their removal (Finland) while in countries like Cyprus deprivation of liberty 
characterises the entire asylum procedure. Cornelisse, who provides a detailed overview of detention 
practices across Europe in her study of immigration detention also finds that widespread discrimination 
exists in asylum detention practices, with some member states routinely detaining certain nationalities or 
ethnic groups, such as Roma in the UK (2010).  
The third category concerns detention for reasons of irregular stay. In most member states, it is not sufficient 
to detain solely on grounds of irregularity and detention is usually justified on grounds that it is necessary to 
carry out removal. This category is therefore considered alongside the fourth scenario; detention for purposes 
of removal or expulsion. Cornelisse finds that despite the fact that this form of detention is intended for the 
purpose of facilitating removal, in practice in many member states foreigners are frequently detained for 
significant periods of time before deportation is arranged, although the maximum duration as stipulated in 
national legislation varies country by country. Cornelisse also notes the common practice of releasing 
detainees when deportations cannot be organised, only to re-apprehend and re-detain those individuals. As a 
result, migrants may spend long periods in detention, with only small breaks of freedom in between, despite 
legislation that lays down time limits. These periods of detention are not captured by statistics covering 
detention rates. 
The notorious lack of clear statistics covering administrative detention in the EU makes it difficult to chart 
precise comparative trends in the use of this procedure. Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus in academic 
literature covering detention that the last decade has seen a dramatic increase in immigration detention rates 
across the EU. For instance, Welch and Schuster in their study of detention of asylum-seekers in the US, UK, 
France, Germany and Italy found that, despite diversities in specific practices:  
“In each of the nations examined, there are significant developments worth noting: growing 
detention populations and longer periods of confinement. Moreover, those governments are 
increasing their efforts to expand detention capacity” (2005, p. 347). 
The authors note that in the UK, until the 1990s there were no permanent detention centres in Britain because 
detention was itself an exceptional measure. This situation changed significantly in the 1990s as numbers 
rose over a 10 year period from 250 people in detention in 1993 to 2260 in 2003. Powers to detain became 
increasingly expansive and successive governments built especially dedicated detention facilities. According 
to Webber, the UK ‘detention estate’ tripled in capacity between 1997 – 2007 (Webber, 2008).  
Figures available on immigration detention in the Netherlands also show a sharp increase (Leerkes and 
Broeders, 2010). Whereas in 1980 the capacity for administrative detention was 45 places, by 2007 this had 
increased to 3,807, with the new detention capacity specifically earmarked for (irregular) migrant detention 
(Broeders, 2010). Immigration detention doubled as a percentage of the total prison capacity between 1999 
to 2006 (from 9.1% to 18.1%) and the annual number of administratively detained immigrants more than 
tripled between 1994 and 2006 (from 3,925 to 12,480). 
In France, from 2003 to 2007 the capacity of administrative detention grew from 739 to 1,724 places and the 
number of people detained annually from 22,220 to 35,923. Mucchieli and Nevanen (2011) estimate that 
every year around 50,000 people are placed in administrative detention in France and approximately 16,500 
in waiting zones, making the flow managed through these forms of detention at least four times greater than 
that in the prison system. 
In addition to increasing capacity, authors have also highlighted a trend towards an expansion of the time 
limits for maximum detention (Merlino, 2009; Welch and Schuster, 2005; Mucchielli and Nevanen, 2011). 
An area deserving further consideration is the profile (nationality/ethnicity) of detainees. Certain member 
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such data could provide greater insight into the migrant groups targeted by detention policies, as well as their 
effects.  
The trends discussed above are mirrored in several pieces of EU legislation covering asylum and the return 
of irregularly residing third country nationals. The most important of these is the Directive on common 
standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third country nationals 
2008/115/EC (hereafter the Returns Directive), adopted in 2008, lays down EU-wide rules and procedures 
for the return of irregular migrants (Zwaan, 2011). During negotiations on the text of the legislation, the rules 
on detention proved particularly contentious and led to fierce criticism from academics and NGOs in the 
aftermath of its adoption (Acosta, 2009; Baldaccini, 2009). Indeed, while the Directive includes a number of 
important legal safeguards that make detention a measure of last resort and include the stipulation that 
member states should only detain a third country national in order to carry out removal, particularly where 
there is a risk of absconding, nevertheless it also introduces a mandatory re-entry ban and harsh rules on 
duration of detention. Thus, the text permits a six-month detention period with a possible 12-month 
extension in the case of delays or uncooperative behaviour in the removal process.  Moreover, during 
negotiations, the insertion of any provisions likely to slow the process of return - e.g. restrictions on 
detention, obligations to provide legal aid and increased possibilities to challenge a return decision - were 
forcefully resisted, leading to claims that the legislation amounts to: “The codification at EU level of an 
expulsion regime that is lacking from a perspective of the rights of the individual” (Baldaccini, 2009).  
Scholarly debate on the Europeanisation of a restrictive immigrant detention regime in the EU demonstrates 
a two-way process of mutually reinforcing norms. Thus on the one hand certain member states, (namely 
Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and the UK) were active in promoting their national norms and agendas 
in EU council negotiations (Acosta, 2009; Pelzer, 2011). At the same time, the adoption of the Returns 
Directive simultaneously legitimised more restrictive regimes at national level. Just as the final agreement on 
the text of the Directive was reached in June 2008, Italy amended its national legislation to increase the 
maximum period of detention for irregular migrants awaiting deportation from 60 days to 18 months 
(reported by the Italian media to be ‘in accordance with European Union guidelines’) (Baldaccini, 2009). A 
number of other countries also extended their maximum detention stays as a result of the Returns Directive, 
including Spain and Greece (Flynn & Cannon, 2010). 
The outcome has led scholars such as Cornelisse to conclude that: 
“The institutionalised practice of immigrant detention has become an inherent part of a policy 
package that has as its main aim to deter future migrants and to remove those already on national 
territory as rapidly and effectively as possible.” 
Taking up this thread, the following sub-section will explore this thesis and the potential drivers behind this 
Europe-wide detention trend. 
3.2  Functions of the new ‘detention apparatus’ 
How does the academic literature frame and explain the proliferation of immigrant detention and what does 
it tell us about the criminalisation of migration?  
Official statements surrounding the expansion of immigration detention by governments and state agencies 
usually focus on the immigration enforcement purposes of such measures. Hence the UK’s re-naming of all 
its immigration detention facilities in 2001 as ‘immigration removal centres’ by the Labour government in 
order to communicate more clearly their purpose (Bosworth, 2012). Indeed, as we have seen in section 3.1, 
according to EU legislation, irregular migrants should be detained only within the context of removal 
proceedings. Such interpretations would support a migration control perspective that views increasing 
immigrant detention as a tool to facilitate the identification, removal and return of irregular migrants already 
arriving and residing in Europe (Albrecht, 2002).      
However, a number of authors have problematised the use of immigrant detention as a migration control 
technique, identifying the very low rate of expulsions as a paradox at the heart of the detention apparatus 
(Broeders, 2010; Broeders and Leerkes, 2010). Removal rates fluctuate widely across Europe, so where 25% 
of agreed expulsions are carried out in Spain (Garcia and Bessa, 2011), in France less than 1% of third 
country nationals subject to return procedures are removed (Basilien-Gainche and Slama, 2011). In the 
Netherlands, Van Kalmthout and Van der Meulen put the figure at below 40% (2007). The reasons for low 
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implementing expulsions, usually due to difficulties identifying an individual, obtaining the right 
documentation, and the lack of cooperation agreements with countries of origin. However, the high costs 
associated with detaining an individual versus the low levels of removals raise fundamental questions about 
the official rationale behind this policy approach. Leerkes and Broeders identify the quandary as follows: 
“Given the persistence and widening of the gap between the large investments in immigration 
detention and the declining ‘proceeds’ thereof in terms of expulsions, the policy does seem to lack 
rationality. Therefore other explanations for the practice of the administrative detention should be 
considered” (2010, p. 836).  
Consequently, they posit three alternative functions of immigration administrative detention, drawing on the 
Dutch context. First, deterring irregular residence. In this view, administrative detention – and the difficult 
conditions it engenders (see 3.3 below) – is intended to coerce detainees into complying with the removal 
procedure and leaving the country. It also may have a general deterrent effect of preventing potential 
migrants from travelling to a certain country or violating the terms of their stay. However, the authors cite a 
general lack of empirical evidence to support this thesis. i.e. growth in detention practices has not equalled a 
parallel growth in expulsion rates, nor caused decreases in irregular immigration inflows. The inefficacy of a 
deterrence function is also supported by Bosworth’s study of UK removal centres:  
“British immigration removal centres fall short of the familiar justifications of custody, namely 
rehabilitation, deterrence or punishment. Because centres only hold around 3000 people per day, 
while hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants live freely in the community… it is difficult 
to argue that such places deter. A border control system under such circumstances functions 
haphazardly at best” (2012, p. 103). 
The second function suggested by Leerkes and Broeders is as a means of managing the external effects of 
poverty. Here they cite the fact that local authorities occasionally use detention as a form of ‘poor relief’ and 
the practice of detaining irregular migrants before large public festivities. Here the aim is not migration 
enforcement but rather to incapacitate a marginal population. This function finds synergies with research 
from the US on banishment, which contends that strategies aimed primarily at spatial exclusion have enjoyed 
a renaissance in recent years, with measures geared towards containment and confinement aimed first and 
foremost at society’s socio-economic underclass of homeless, drug addicts and migrants (Beckett and 
Herbert, 2010). 
The third hypothesis concerns managing popular anxiety and symbolically asserting state control. Despite 
the restrictions on the state’s ability to control its borders and implement expulsion, the increase in 
immigration detention communicates the message that the state is still in control of the geographical and 
social boundaries that citizens want it to maintain.   
This thesis is supported by authors who draw on David Garland’s theory of the culture of control (2001). The 
failure of restrictive border and migration management policies forces governments to seek to create order 
through penal means (Weber and Bowling, 2008). Weber and Bowling make the following observation: 
“The economic and political capital invested in the politics of exclusion is clear when one considers 
border protection policies that usually fail the usual neo-liberal standards of fiscal restraint and cost-
effectiveness, but retain popular appeal as powerful expressions of order-seeking through 
sovereignty… These strategies evince a sort of ‘nationalist security’ in which nationalist ideology 
merges with a national security agenda, so that border control resonates with fears of both cultural 
dilution and physical attack.”  
Finally, along similar lines, other scholars studying the drivers of immigrant detention have looked to the 
criminological literature on New Penology (Cornelisse, 2010, Broeders, 2012; Garcia and Bessa, 2011). The 
concept of New Penology, developed by Feely and Simon in 1992, leaves behind notions of correction or 
rehabilitation and puts the emphasis on actuarial policies and techniques that are concerned with identifying, 
classifying and managing groups by their categorisation as ‘dangerous’. The new penology logic accepts the 
impossibility of eliminating crime and focuses instead on identifying risk – attributed to certain societal 
groups by dint of social factors associated with them. Migrants here become the latest risk category to join 
the underclass designated by actuarial, preventive policies. Thus, according to this argument, irregular 
migrants are in essence “not detained because of individual crimes or behavior, but because of their 
‘membership’ of a group that is classified as dangerous, or at least unwanted. Administrative detention may 
simply be a way to deal with this group, especially when expulsion is failing” (Broeders, 2012, p. 182). 16 | JOANNA PARKIN 
3.3  Consequences of criminalisation through detention 
As discussed in section 3.2 above, the literature indicates that detention serves little deterrent function and its 
role in facilitating the state’s objective to remove irregularly residing immigrants falls short of ‘success’. 
What, then, are the unintended consequences and effects of the widespread use of detention in Europe? 
Bosworth notes the lack of scholarly attention paid to this question, which she attributes to the general 
absence of information and transparency surrounding detention practices and the difficulties in obtaining 
permission to conduct empirical research in detention facilities (2012). However, sufficient research has 
come to light on detention conditions, which indicate the detrimental impact of detention practices of 
migrants’ human rights. Guild (2005) highlights that detention of migrants in all European member states 
must comply with Articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Article 3 stipulates that 
conditions of detention must not constitute torture, inhuman or degrading treatment while Article 5 
recognises that detention is contrary to the principle of liberty of the person and must be justified on the basis 
of a set of conditions laid down in Article 5.1. 
Breaches of Article 3 ECHR are identified by Webber (2008) who lists allegations of abuse, assault, threats 
and torture that have pervaded detention systems across Europe. Cornelisse, in her overview of detention 
practices in Europe, also indicates that illegal detention beyond maximum time limits, use of unlawful force 
by government officials and serious overcrowding are commonplace and in countries such as the 
Netherlands and France, detention conditions for foreigners detained under immigration legislation are of a 
lower standard than that of penal institutions (Cornelisse, 2010). 
The requirement under Article 5 ECHR to justify the necessity and appropriateness of detention on a case-
by-case basis also appears increasingly moribund in many national contexts where detention has become a 
systematic response in the authorities’ management of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Thus 
Cornelisse (2010) notes that whereas in most countries detention was originally intended as an individual 
measure of last resort, it has in contemporary practice become a large-scale instrument, targeting specific 
categories of persons and leaving less scope for the consideration of individual circumstances. Indeed, Welch 
and Schuster confirm that in the UK for instance “there is no automatic or independent scrutiny of the 
lawfulness, appropriateness or length of detention” (Welch and Schuster, 2005, p. 337). However, with the 
increasing use of detention by EU member states, recent years have seen a parallel emergence of 
jurisprudence before the courts contesting national practices under Article 5.1 ECHR. Further research is 
needed to examine whether this jurisprudence is impacting government policies on detention. For instance, 
are detention policies becoming more ‘sophisticated’ in order to bring them within the human rights 
framework? 
Before proceeding it is worth remembering that, although immigration detention has become a customary 
feature and standard practice of different European legal systems, this is nevertheless an exceptionally severe 
juridical measure. Barring capital punishment, deprivation of liberty is the most serious sanction that a state 
can levy against an individual. Against this background, several authors, particularly those from the field of 
criminal law, have focused on the effects of resorting to administrative law in the implementation of 
immigrant detention. Ericson (cited in Broeders, 2010) describes this practice or measure as a form of 
‘counter-law’ – laws invented to “erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards, and procedures of 
criminal law that get in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm.” On a similar track, Becket and 
Herbert (2010) discuss the proliferation of legally hybrid techniques that blend elements of civil and criminal 
law, and as a result, often shift the burden of proof away from the state, providing minimal avenues for 
contestation, and diminishing the rights-bearing capacity of their targets. The general problem facing 
detainees of lack of access to judicial remedies and legal contestation is all the more critical when 
considering the use of waiting zones and extra-territorial detention, the latter of which is promoted and 
funded as a strategic element of the EU’s migration policy. Such measures detain people even before they’ve 
arrived on the territory of a state, situating them in a legal grey area and without even the minimal guarantees 
applicable to the deprivation of liberty (Cornelisse 2010; Guild, 2005).  
Finally, other authors have considered the impact of mass migrant detention on general perceptions of 
immigrants and the construction of migrants as a risk category. Chacon (2009), for instance, argues that 
detention creates a negative feedback loop in public opinion, further demonizing migrants and having a 
powerful effect in the representation of foreigners as criminal offenders, security threats and welfare abusers. 
Following a similar thread, Rahola (2011) argues that detention camps re-construct their inmates as persons 
potentially internable and deportable. Moreover, the ‘detention machine’ takes on the attributes of a THE CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE | 17 
punishment to address a specific ‘crime’ – that of having crossed a border. Thus, despite the fact that 
administrative measures are not intended to be punitive, immigrant detention nevertheless produces both the 
crime of clandestinity and the criminal figure of the clandestine. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the scholarly debates drawn from academic literature and EU-funded research 
projects in order to understand the phenomena broadly termed the ‘criminalisation of migration’. It finds that 
criminalisation has, during the past two decades, intensified significantly across the European Union in 
diverse manifestations: whether via public perceptions or discourse; in the increasing intersections between 
criminal law and migration management or in the widespread practice of immigrant detention as a large-
scale instrument being applied as an automatic control mechanism to govern irregular migration.  
The paper takes as its starting point the observation that there is little evidence that immigrants, regular or 
irregular, are responsible for a disproportionate share of crime. It therefore asks what is driving these trends 
if they cannot be understood as a response to problems of crime committed by non-citizens? It finds that this 
question has, during the past decade, attracted growing interest from academics from a wide range of 
disciplines, including scholars of migration law and studies, security studies, criminology and criminal law. 
Despite the diverse approaches and perspectives taken by academics, a number of synergies can be 
identified. At the same time, this state-of-the-art has also revealed a number of gaps in the research or 
questions deserving further enquiry and exploration. These synergies and gaps are summarised as follows: 
First, the evidence presented in the literature indicates that criminalisation trends bear little relation to certain 
empirical developments that one might expect, such as fluctuations in crime rates or immigration rates. 
Rather, the determining drivers appear to be factors that affect the degree to which non-citizens are perceived 
as a threat – often periods of economic and social crisis and structural upheaval. One might logically expect 
that the past five years of economic crisis and recession, which has left almost no EU member states 
untouched, will influence criminalisation trends in Europe. This is a question that has yet to be explored and 
could pave the way for further research.  
Second, the criminalisation of migration is a process driven by multiple actors, including politicians, press, 
security officials and agencies, who are motivated by diverse yet overlapping interests and agendas. The 
progressive transfer of powers to the European Union in the field of Justice and Home Affairs during the past 
20 years has opened the way for new avenues and actors at EU level and created a dynamic impulse for the 
criminalisation of migration in EU law and policy, which appears to have both replicated national 
approaches and in turn is legitimising and institutionalising national practices. The continual evolution of 
European powers in these domains requires further in-depth research to ascertain who the actors are and 
which are the processes driving criminalisation of migration at European level. On what basis are these 
policy approaches pursued and how are they being translated into national policy, legislation and public 
discourses?  
Third, the increasingly blurred boundaries between criminal law and migration management operate under a 
two-way process. First, criminal law is increasingly intersecting with immigration law and is being invoked 
to regulate migration matters. At the same time, administrative regimes are, with increasing prevalence, 
imposing sanctions akin to punishment but denying the protections of criminal process. These conflating 
trends open a series of deeper questions about how scholars across disciplines should broach questions of 
‘crimes’ of mobility. Given the administrative nature of border control, detention, deportation etc, can these 
be understood within existing theoretical frameworks about punishment and society? What do they tell us 
about the changing nature and rationales behind punishment and the way in which penal power is expanding 
and changing its justification and effects? How do such crimes of mobility impact ‘normative legitimacy’ of 
criminal justice systems (Hough and Sato, 2013)? In other words, to what extent do they meet substantive 
criteria of fairness, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, rule of law and human rights? Given the 
important drawbacks already indicated in the literature of addressing migration management with criminal 
law, as well as the limitations of extending an administrative regime with the asymmetric incorporation of 
criminal norms (Legomsky, 2007), how best to delimit the process of ‘crimmigration’? The lack of 
comparative research on ‘crimmigration law’ trends across European member states represents a notable gap 
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Fourth, there is a striking absence of social science research examining the consequences of criminalisation 
for the individuals targeted by these laws, policies and practices. While criminology literature has explored 
the social exclusion effects of criminal justice on diverse sections of the citizenry, it has so far overlooked 
this process with regard to non-citizens. With the exception of a handful of EU-funded research projects that 
make general observations, there is no systematic research that focuses specifically on the question of how 
criminalisation practices in different member states impact the socio-economic position, choices and legal 
statuses of migrants who fall under their scope. A cross-comparative research input could, in this respect, 
make a valuable contribution to assessing the gap between policy objectives and policy outcomes. 
Concerning administrative detention, scholarly attention to which migrant groups are targeted in particular 
by detention policies would be an important starting point to assess their consequences and effects.  
Fifth, a recurring theme throughout the literature is the ‘symbolic’ nature of criminalising policies – geared 
primarily towards communicating a message towards the public rather than achieving stated policy goals. 
Indeed, when measured against various criteria of efficacy and impact (budgetary, societal, human rights, 
migration control), the success of such policies appears very limited. This observation generates a series of 
questions on the impact of criminalisation of migration for trust in public policy-making, the police and 
justice systems. Indeed, given the academic consensus surrounding the mis-application of criminal law in the 
field of migration control and its risks to the foundational principles of criminal justice, there is surprisingly 
little reflection in the literature to key questions that concern the FIDUCIA project, such as the impact on 
public trust in the police and courts as a result of ‘crimmigration’ trends. An important research question to 
pursue would therefore be what influence does this ‘policy gap’ between official policy goals and actual 
outcomes have on the empirical legitimacy of criminal justice systems (i.e. individuals’ perceptions of the 
legitimacy of justice systems) and in levels of trust in justice institutions? Does the public believe that 
‘crimmigration’ policies are legitimate? Do they see the structures of authority and policies regulating 
migrants, and those who act in solidarity with them, as fair and effective? On the one hand there is a general 
perception that the wider public endorses, even demands, restrictive migration control policies from their 
governments. One could therefore imagine a scenario whereby criminalisation of migration policies would 
instil greater public trust, leading to the paradoxical situation where trust is created through governments 
excluding and exacerbating the marginalisation of certain categories of individuals. However, any 
understanding of public perception and the criminalisation of migration should also examine the ‘spaces of 
contestation’ that have opened up around ‘crimmigration’ policies. More research on the proliferation of 
campaigns that have emerged in support of irregular migrants and against criminalising policies and 
practices in the past decade, including the use of civil disobedience by members of the public and 
professional groups, could help to provide a more multi-layered understanding of how criminalising 
migration impacts empirical legitimacy and public trust. 
Finally, this state-of-the-art review underscores that the criminalisation of migration – as one of the four 
‘new crimes’ examined by the FIDUCIA project - must be treated with a certain degree of sensitivity. 
Criminality here is less associated with an ‘act’ but rather treated as the condition of a person, i.e. illegality is 
not an action but a facet of a migrants’ very being. Moreover, as several scholars argue, given the complex 
nature of regulations governing migration status in European countries, the law itself often creates the status 
of ‘illegality.’  Questions of fostering normative compliance with ‘crimmigration’ policies, must therefore be 
approached in this context. We would contend that the choice of whether to comply or not to comply with 
the law is here not the central question: in the vast majority of cases the individual would like nothing more 
than to regularise their status or comply with criteria for authorised residence and employment. Furthermore, 
fostering compliance with certain ‘crimmigration’ laws (e.g. legislation criminalising solidarity) could raise 
profound moral and ethical dilemmas: should, for instance, a doctor refuse to treat a patient because they are 
lacking the correct papers? Against this background, when considering the interplay between criminalisation 
of migration and trust in justice, public trust and institutional legitimacy should be considered as intrinsic 
values in and of themselves (rather than as means to foster compliance with the law) as well as points of 
reference in determining relations between communities and the police; influencing access to justice by 
vulnerable groups; and facilitating processes of integration and social inclusion of migrants and ethnic 
minorities.  THE CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE | 19 
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Annex 2. List of EU-funded projects examined covering the criminalisation of migration 
Project title  Funding authority  Coordinator  Duration  Aims and objectives 
Fundamental rights of 




ICMPD, Austria  2009 - 2011  The aim of FRIM is to examine key aspects of the situation of irregular immigrants 
in the European Union in order to assess the extent to which their fundamental 
rights are respected and protected. Areas covered by the research include health, 
housing, education, social care, employment status and fair working conditions and 
access to remedies against violations and abuse. 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/fundamental-rights-migrants-irregular-
situation-european-union  
Assessing deviance, crime 
and prevention in Europe 
(CRIMPEV) 
European Commission, 
DG Research (6th 
Framework Programme) 
Centre National 
de la Recherche 
Scientifique, 
France 
2006 –  2009  To produce a European comparative assessment of: factors of deviant behaviours; 
processes of criminalisation; perceptions of crime; links between illegal or socially 
deviant behaviour and organised crime; and public policies of prevention. 
More info at: http://www.crimprev.eu   
Undocumented migration: 
counting the uncountable 
(CLANDESTINO) 
European Commission, 




2007 - 2009  To provide an inventory of data and estimates on undocumented migration (stocks 
and flows) in selected EU countries, to analyse these data comparatively, and  to 
discuss the ethical and methodological issues involved in the collection of data, the 
elaboration of estimates and their use, and to propose a new method for evaluating 
and classifying data/estimates on undocumented migration in the EU. 
More info at: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr  




Directorate General for 
Justice, Freedom and 
Security 
ICMPD, Austria  2007 - 2008  To provide a thorough mapping of practices relating to the regularisation of third 
country nationals illegally resident in EU Member States; to investigate the 
relationship of regularisation policies to the overall migration policy framework, 
and examine the political positions of different stakeholders towards regularisation 
policies on the  national level as well as potential options for policies on 
regularisation on the European level.  
http://research.icmpd.org/1184.html  
The Changing landscape 
of European Liberty and 
Security (CHALLENGE) 
European Commission, 





2004 - 2009  To facilitate more responsive and responsible judgements about new regimes and 
practices of the emerging security interface in order to minimize the degree to 
which they undermine civil liberties, human rights and social cohesion; to create an 
observatory charged with the analysis and evaluation of the changing relationship 
between sustainable security, stability and liberty in an enlarging EU, which 
upholds the values of democracy. 












2007 to 2009  To deepen understanding of the impact of migration flows on EU labour markets 
and to theorise the relationship between the presence of ‘informal’ or ‘shadow’ 
industry labour markets and migration flows; to deepen knowledge of how legal 
status interacts with migrant labour market positions. 
http://www.undocumentedmigrants.eu/ 
Support and Opposition to 
Migration (SOM) 
European Commission, 
DG Research (7th 
Framework Programme) 





2009  -  2012  To examine the politicisation of migration in seven European countries and 
determine why and when potential conflicts over migration become politicised, 
examining both anti-immigration and anti-racist movements. The project aims to 
increase knowledge about the political dynamics related to migration, and provide 
policy-relevant information. 
On the margins of the EU  
(EUMARGINS) 
European Commission, 




2008 - 2011  To  examine  experiences of social inclusion/exclusion among young adults with 
immigrant background in seven local urban-metropolitan areas in seven different 
European countries and identify and prioritise those factors that matter most (for 
specific young adult migrant groups and in different countries as well as for all 
young adult migrant groups and across Europe), laying a foundation for 
recommendations that can assist the transitions from exclusion to inclusion, 
particularly focusing on dominant factors of unemployment/jobs and the related 
education aspects. 
http://www.sv.uio.no/iss/english/research/projects/eumargins/  
A typology of different 
types of centres in Europe 
European Parliament, 
DG Internal Policies of 
the Union, Directorate C 




2005  To examine three issues around the detention of foreigners in the EU: the law that 
governs camps; who is found in the camps; and what types of camps are missing. 
The starting place of this examination is the law of the European Union – what are 
the parameters within which national law applies and how does national law comply 
with those parameters. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2006/378268/IPOL-
LIBE_NT(2006)378268_EN.pdf  
Book of Solidarity: 














2003  To highlight the manifold ways solidarity is extended to undocumented migrants in 
on different geographical regions in Europe, exploring assistance to undocumented 
migrants and the rights of help providers against the background of a tendency to 
criminalise assistance to undocumented migrants, which albeit in an indirect way 
strongly affects undocumented migrants themselves.  
http://picum.org/en/publications/reports/ 
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EU minorities and 






2007  -  2099  To provide primary survey data collected from selected ethnic minority and 
immigrant persons resident in the EU Member States. This survey data will support 
policy-makers and other key stakeholders in developing evidence-based and 
targeted policies that address discriminatory, racist practices, and improve support 













2008  -  2011  To develop and pilot survey-based indicators of public confidence in justice, to 
assemble contextual data for interpreting the indicators – on the assumption that 
there are close relationships between public perceptions of justice and the 
substantive quality of justice as reflected in the workings of the justice process – 
and to develop tools for presenting and interpreting the indicators in ways that are 
intuitive and accessible. 
http://www.eurojustis.eu/ 
EDUMIGROM (Ethnic 
differences  in education 
and diverging prospects 
for  urban youth 
European Commission, 




2008  -  2011  To conduct a comparative investigation in ethnically diverse communities with 
second-generation migrants and Roma in nine countries of the European Union. 
http://www.edumigrom.eu/  
(TEMPO) Temporary 
migration, integration and 







2009  -  2013  To use an array of existing and new datasets to examine the causes and 
consequences of temporary migration, considering both the perspective of the 
source and the destination country; to study the patterns of integration of economic 
and non-economic migrants, and how they relate to the time dimension of the 
migration decision and look at the process through which policies towards 







Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS 
acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
•  Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
•  Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
•  Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 